Abstract: This paper deals with a class of equilibria for differential games where memory strategies are allowed. This class permits the inclusion of a threat in a cooperative strategy. The threat will be used as soon as one player is not controlling the system according to the agreed upon cooperative control. We characterize the set of such equilibria.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce and characterize a class of equilibria for differential games, based on the use of memory strategies.
The consideration of memory strategies in differential games can be traced back to Frieaann [2] , Krasovskii and Subbotin [1] , Varaiya and Lin [3] . In these works, mainly concerned with zero-sum differential games, memory strategies were used as a convenient tool for proving existence theorems. However the optimality concepts used, e.g. saddle-point, would usually lead to optimal solutions obtained in the class of feedback strategies and characterized by Hamilton- Jacobi equations (see Refs [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] ).
In the context of non-zero sum differential games, Friedmann proposed in chapter 8 of his book a direct extension of the approach used for zero-sum differential games, and characterized feedback equilibrium strategies.
In the present paper we intend to show that, in the setting of non-zero sum differential games, memory strategies allow for a much wider class of equilibria than those defined by feedback strategies. For this class of equilibria we can obtain a complete characterization and give sufficient conditions for existence of at least one solution.
The result seems interesting since the computation of these equilibria is much easier than in the case of feedback equilibria, and, furthermore, the consideration of such equilibria permits a new approach to cooperative differential gams.
Usually the concept of equilibrium refers to a non cooperative mood of play. When the players decide to cooperate, one usually looks for an undominated solution, also called a Pareto solution. There are various schemes proposed in the general theory of games for picking a particular Pareto outcome as the solution in a cooperative ga. Nash [6] , [7] proposed an axiomatic approach for the characterization of a unique outcome in bargaining games. This approach has been followed by many others (Roth [8] ).
A direct extension of Nash's bargaining solution to differential games was first proposed by Liu [9] and more recently studied further by Ray (10] and Ray and Blaquigre [11] . However the important question of acceptability of a bargaining solution in the context of a dynamic game was raised by Raurie (121, [13] .
Actually the choice of a bargaining solution according to Nash's theory depends essentially on the initial data of the game, i.e. the initial state (to, x°) and the threats to be used by both players in case of no agreement at (to 10). The problem of acceptability stems from the fact that at some intermediate point (t,x*(t)) of the trajectory generated by the cooperative strategies, it could well happen that it is advantageous for one Ji(x(.);x0;t0iT) = q (x(T)) i=l,2. These mappings define the pay-offs for the two players associated with the various possible trajectories emanating from x°.
Strateg
The game is played through the use of strategies. A stragegy is a method of adapting the control of one player to the information he receives in the course of the game.
For any positive inteRer N we define (10) Notice that, by the very definition of D (r,C there always exists yr(,() achieving (9) or (10) with (6) arbitrarily small. Therefore a threat always exists at any point ( Otherwise the control ui(.) used will be determined 8 by the value of the 6-feedback threat strategy y8.
This defines completely the 8-strategy pair A Notice that for any 8 the outcome w of the 6-strategy pair A*6 is the same and given by
Therefore the strategy pair A will also have a unique outcome w* with By (9) one has q (X"(T)) _ D2(r+h, x r+h)) + 2(8)
As 6 goes to zero, h also tends to 0, and thus by the convergence of D6(r,() toward D2Q(r,) and by the continuity of D2(,), one has q(x(T))c D2(t, x Ct)) (12) Since x C.) is acceptable by (11) , it satisfies:
q2(x*(T)) > D2(r, x*(t)) (13) From (12) and (13) The same reasoning would apply for obtaining the symmetric inequality of equilibrium condition b.
This result shows that, associated with the set of acceptable trajectories, there is a set of equilibria in the class of memcry strategies defined in section 4.
The next result establishes a sort of reciprocal relation between the set of equilibria and the set of acceptable trajectories. Proposition (14) is nonempty. Thus, to establish the existence of an equilibrium we need to show that the set S is nonempty. In fact, we are able to do this under the additional condition that the two threat games admit saddle points. As discussed in Section 5, player i determines his threat strategy by considering the zero sum game, where he and his opponent, player J, seek respectively to minimize and maximize the pay-off function q (x(T)) (i,J=l,2, j.i). We say that such a game admits a AS: f(t,x,ul, U2) = fl(t,x,ul) + f2(t'x'u2).
The following result has been derived in [2] . Similarly we can stow that q2 (x (T)) > D2(T,x*()) which implies that x (*) E S and S is nonempty. Corollary 7.1: Under conditions (Al)-(A5) the differential game defined in sections 2 and 3 has an equilibrium. s The existence of an equilibrium is the rule rather than exception for cooperative differential gins. Mkreover, the set S will usually have more than one element, implying nonuniqueness of equilibrium. To deal with this-problem and obtain a single outcome, which could be considered the solution of the game, one has to apply a bargaining procedure to the set of all acceptable outcomes. From this point of view it is important to obtain some further characterization of the set S. So, we end this section with the following easy consequence of Propositions 2.2 and 5.1. Proposition 7.3: Let the conditions (A)-(A4) hold. Then the set S is compact in the topology of uniform convergence on [t ,T] .
